The solution is given here for the infinitely repeated two-person zero-sum,games of inr complete information characterized by 2 X 2 games, with information matrxces b for the ftrst game and( b ab)for the second game.
Introduction
Two main classes of repeated two person zero-sum games with incomplete information are solved up to now: -Games in which the information matrices matrices may depend on the player but not on the state of nature [Mertens and Zamir, Mertens] .
-Games in which the information matrices do not depend on the players, may depend on the state of nature, with the additional assumption that each player recalls all prior moves [Kohlberg and Zamir, Kohlberg] .
It seems that without those assumptions one loses the recursive structure that made those cases tractable.
Here an example is solved of a game not fulfilling those assumptions. It was mentioned as an open problem some six years ago [Zamir] :
There are two possible states of nature and accordingly two payoff matrices, A =/all\a21 a22/ a12 1 and /3 = (bb~ at b~2~), the actual payoff matrix (i.e. the actual state of nature) is chosen once and for all by the referee (with probability p for matrix A), and told to neither player. There are in addition two information matrices H A =
=(ab bb) andHt3=(b ba),aandbbeingtwodifferentletters. Aftereachstage, ifT
is the true payoff matrix (A or B), and the players I and II played their pure strategies i and/respectively, the referee transfers ti/from player II's account to player I's and tell both players the letter H ft. The players get no statement on their accounts before the end of the game. It is crucial here that the moves i and]" are not stated explicitly by the referee, However, each player recalls his own move (i or]) and all his own previous moves in addition to the information statements H T made by the referee up to that stage.
Notice that as soon as the letter a is announced by the referee, the true matrix is revealed to both players. 
For a proof of this result let us introduce a few conventions: We may obviously substract from the matrices A and/3 their values v (A) and v (/3) respectively, which will substract from all payoffs the constant pv (A) + (1 -p) v (/3). Hence we may assume without loss of generality that v (A) = v (/3) = 0. We may multiply A by p and/3 by (1 -p), and consider the payoff to be the sum of the payoffs that would be obtained if A was the true matrix and if/3 was the true matrix. We will do this in order to simplify slightly notations. Finally x' will always stand for 1 -x. 1. We define the following auxiliary game P:
Here L (resp. R, T, B) stands for the strategy (of player II) of playing always Left (resp. Right, Top, Bottom); (1 ~-e) T (resp. (1-e)B) stands for the strategy of playing at every stage independently with probability (1 --e) Top (resp. B) and with probability e Bottom (resp. T). (/3J) stands for strategy of playing at each stage and independently with probability/3 Left and with probability/3' Right. Finally T1 (resp. B 1 ) stands for a strategy consisting of playing once T (resp. B) and all other times B (resp. T). The entries F can be easily obtained as asymptotic payoffs corresponding to those strategies, using our previous conventions (and thinking of/3 as strictly between 0 and 1).
Denote by ~ the value of P. If we denote by Max Min P and Min Max P the max Min and Min Max value of our original game in the strong sense that we described we shall prove that Min Max P = g and that it may be different from Max Min I'. To make these statements rigorous we need still two more definitions:
2. Let us define: ~o~ =inf{U 3N37" s.t. Vn>~NVOn,Pn(0n,7")<,U} = sup {U I V 7", q a s.t. lira inf Pn (a, 7")/> U} n ...4. e~ where o (resp. r) stands for a strategy of player I (resp. II) in the infinite game while o n (resp. rn) stands for a strategy of player I (resp. II) in a game consisting of n stages only. Pn (O, 7") is the expected average payoff per stage in the first n stages, given or, 7"
(1 ~ tijvt ,,. where T = (tij) is the true payoff matrix and p;i.e. Pn (o, r) =Eo,r, p \n k=l chosen by the referee at the begining of the game.
Loosely speaking, ~ is the lowest value of lim sup Pn that player II can guarantee in the infinite game while ~ is the highest value of lim inf Pn that cannot be guaranteed by player II. Clearly ~ ~< ~. In the next section we will prove that = 170 = ~, which establishes that ~7 is Min Max P in the above explained sense.
Proofs
For a strategy of player I in E let (a, a') be the probability distribution induced on (1 ~ e) T and ( 1 ~ e) B.
Lemma 1. For any a corresponding to any undominated optimal strategy of Player I in P that uses (1 -e) T or (1 -e)B with a positive probability, one of the following holds: aa12/> 0 and a'b21 ) 0 (3.1) abll >~0 and a'a22 ~0 (3.2)
Proof. Assume that for some optimal a neither of(3.1) and (3.2) holds, so for instance abl I < 0 (the case a'a22 < 0 is completely symmetric). Since abl i ~ 0 and v (B) = 0, we have b21 ) 0 and thus also aa12 < 0 ( since 3.1) does not hold). Since aa12 < 0 and v (A) = 0, we have a22/> 0. But this implies that the strategy (1 -~ e) B of player I strictly dominates his strategy (1 -~ e) T in E, and thus that a = 0 which contradicts the assumption abl ~ < O.
Theorem 1. ~ >~
Proof. Consider an arbitrary strategy r of player II and an arbitrary e (0 < e < 1). r may be considered as a probability measure P on the space a of all sequences of L (left) and R (right) with the understanding that as soon as the true matrix is revealed, player II switches to his optimal strategy in that matrix.
Letpl =P (/~),P2 =P (/~),P3 =P(f2\ {/~,/~})= 1 -Pl -P2. Let ~2.0 denote the subset of ~2 consisting of sequences with infinitely many L and infinitely many R. Let {Li} denote the subset of ~2 with a finite non-zero number of L in the sequence, and similarly {R i} is the subset of those sequences with a finite non-zero number ofR.
We shall refer to these finitely many L or R as the exceptional moves.
Define N1 by:
Prob.
[player II has not played all his exceptional moves before N 11 {L i} U {Ri}] < e andN2 by:
Prob. {number of L and R in the intervall IN1, N2 [ are both at least in e In(l-e) I fZ,.} > 1-e with the understanding that whenever the conditioning set has zero probability, the corresponding integer takes its least possible value (1 or N1 + 1).
It follows from the definitions that even if player I plays (1 --e) B in IN1, N2 [, matrix A (if it is the true matrix) will be revealed with probability greater tharl 1 --2 e, given f2o. , and also that:
Let (ql, q2, o~q3, cx'q3, q4, qs) be an undominated optimal strategy of player I in lY. For any k >N2, let o k be the following strategy of player I: 9 with probability ql, play 9 with probability q2, play B 9 with probability q3, choose H with probability a and S with probability tx' and play: -if(3.1) holds: ifH :B up toN1 and (1 --e) T afterNl. ffS : Tup toN1 and (1 -~ e)B afterN 1 .
-if (3.2) holfs: ifH : T up to NI and (1---e) T after NI.
ifS :B up toN1 and (1 -e)B afterN1. 9 with probability q4, play a strategy B~, with the time of playing B chosen independently of all other choices and uniformly in [1, k] . 9 with probability qs, play a strategy T~, with the time of playing T chosen independently of all other choices and uniformly in [ 1, k] . We have for all n > k, 1In <<.N~/n <<.N2/n <~ k/n; line <<. k/n, 1/k <<. e. 
P ( (Li} ) (aa12 + 30 (e) + 0 (Na/n)) + p '({Ri}) (a'b=l + 30 (e) + O (N1/n)) if (3.2) holds: P ({Li}) (a'as2 + 30 (e) + 0 (N1/n) + 0 (1/ne)) +P ({Ri}) (abll + 30 (e) + 0 (N1/n) + 0 (1/ne)) + q4 [Pl (bll + 0 (i/n)) +Ps (als + 0 (k/n)) +Pa (fk (fn b'' +fn bls) + 0 (l/k) + 0 (e) + 0 (k/n)}] + qs [Pl (b21 + 0 (k/n)) +P2 (azs+ 0 (l/n)) +P3 Oak (fnas, +fna22) + 0 (l/k) + 0 (e) + 0 (k/n)}]
Using relations (3.3) and Lemma 1 we get that for all n > k:
on (%' r) > E (H (k, n, r, ~)) -4 Me --0 (k/n),
where H(k, n, r,,~) = ql q r bll al~ + b12 bll (q~, q2, o~q3, c?q3, q4, qs) is an optimal strategy of player I in P. In addition C is compact and convex for o (L =, L 1 ) arid ~ is affine and continuous in each variable separately on C. It follows that ~ has a saddle point, hence:
Now g is also in the closure of the convex hull of (f/I i >N2 } when L~ is endowed with the Mackey topology r (L ~, L 1 ) -due to the convexity of the set -(this is a well known result that follows from the Hahn-Banach theorem). Since on bounded sets ofL~ the Mackey topology r (L ~, L~) coincides with the topology of convergence in I probability, it follows that there exist X i (1 ~<i ~</, X i >/O, I; X i = 1) i=1
xifki-gl> )< "
Let now o e,r be the strategy of player I consisting of choosing at the start of the game a number i (1 ~< i ~</) with probability Xi, znd thereafter using his strategy Oki. Let also K M = max (k i I 1 <~ i <~ l} then we have:
Thus: V r, strategy of player II, V e, 0 < e < 1, 30e,r, strategy of player I, such that:
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 2. Player II has an optimal strategy in 1~ using only a single value of/L Proof. A priori player II's optimal strategy in F consists of a probability vector (Pz, P2, P3) together with a probability measure/2 on [0, 1] to choose/3. We want to show that player II has an optimal strategy in which tCs support is a single point in [0, 11. L 1) If b~ 1 >~ b12 and a22 >~ a21 the result follows from the convexity in/3 of the payoff function.
L 2) Otherwise we have either b~ < b~ 2 or a22 < a21, by symmetry we may assume that a22 <a:x. Since v (A) = 0 it follows that a22 < 0. L 2.1) If in addition b~ t <~ bx2 the payoff function is concave in 13 and thus # is dominated by the probability on {0, 1 } that has the same mean. So without loss of generality wemay assume that in this case/~ (]0, 1D = 0. We get thus for 1~ a 6 • 4 matrix with L, R, 13 = 1 and 13 = 0 as pure strategies for player II. The other strategies are eliminated by domination. In addition v (/3) = 0 implies b~l ~<O, and thus we conclude that rowsBl, and T1 are dominated by (I -e) T and (1 --e) B respectively. If either b 21 ~< 0 or a12 < 0, one of the rows/3 = 1 or/3 = 0 is dominated by L orR respectively and the result follows. If either a:l ~< 0 or b12 <~ 0, say a21 < 0 then first B is dominated by (1 -e)B and then ~3 = 0 is dominated by 13 = 1 ; the result follows again. Thus we may assume that Min (a12, a21, bl;~, b21) > 0, it follows then from v (A) =v(3) = 0 that bli < 0, a~.; <0.
L 2.!.1) Ifr ~< 0 and if we denote by (13,3') the relative weights of the columns /3 = 1 and 13 = 0, then there exists an optimal 13 for which 13bll + 13'b12 ~< 0 and 3a21 + ~3'a22 ~ 0 (ifc < 0, the required/3 is the relative weight of the last two columns in the equalizing strategy of player II, if c >~ 0 the vatue of the game is 0 and an optimal strategy of player II is (0, 0, 3,/3') where 3 is optimal in R and hence satisfies the required inequalities). It follows that if in that optimal strategy, player II would replace the c~umns 3 = 1 and/3 = 0 by i.i.d. (/3,13) , rows B 1 and T1 would still be dominated by (1--e) T and (1 Z e)B respectively and hence player II has in this case an optimal strategy using a single/3. L 2.1.2) Ifr > 0, the optimal mixture of the columns 3 = 1 and 3 = 0 is (13,13'), 13 being optimal in R and hence ~3"b1 1 "+ 13tb12 ) 0 and 3a21 4" 3'a22 > 0. It follows again that replacing the last two columns by i.i.d. (13,~'), rows B~ and T1 remain dominated, this time by T and/~ respectively, providing again a single 13 optimal strategy for player II. L 2.2) We are thus left with the case: a22 <a21, a22<0, b12 <311, b12~<0.
Consider player II's optimal strategy in the game F withoutthe rowsB1 and T~ ; it obviously implies 13 = 0. For this 3, B 1 is dominated by (1 -e) T and T1 by (i ~-e) B and thus this single 13 strategy is also optimal in F.This completes the proof of Lemma 2. Notice that the strategies 13 = 1 and/3 = 0 in P should be interpreted as playing i.i.d. (1 -e, e) and (e, 1 --e) respectively. Thus in the single 3 optimal strategy for player II established in Lemma 2 we may assume 0 </3 < 1.
Theorem 2. ~ <. ~.
Proof. We will show that whenever player II plays in I" one of his strategies r in F, consisting of a mixture of L,, R and one (/3,-/3') -with 0 < 13 < 1 -any pure strategy of player I yields in I" n a payoff dominated up to terms 0 (l/n) by a convex combination of rows of F. Since by Lemma 2 player II can guarantee ~ -up to e -by such mixtures 7" against rows of F, the result w~ll then follow.
If the pure strategy of player I is T or B then it is already a row of F. Take any other pure strategy that begins say with T (for strategies starting with B the discussion is completely dual). Let co i = 1 if T occurs at time i in the strategy and co i = 0 otherwise. Let fn = 1 ~ c~ and ~t+ 1 be the first zero in the sequence (COl). 
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Since all terms are convex in y, we may replace y by its extreme values 1/n and f.
Neglecting terms 0 (l/n) one gets thus:
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